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Perspective Piece
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Abstract. The optimal time to initiate research on emergencies is before they occur. However, timely initiation of highquality research may launch during an emergency under the right conditions. These include an appropriate context, clarity
in scientiﬁc aims, preexisting resources, strong operational and research structures that are facile, and good governance.
Here, Nebraskan rapid research efforts early during the 2020 coronavirus disease pandemic, while participating in the ﬁrst
use of U.S. federal quarantine in 50 years, are described from these aspects, as the global experience with this severe
emerging infection grew apace. The experience has lessons in purpose, structure, function, and performance of research
in any emergency, when facing any threat.

under which coronavirus disease (COVID-19) was introduced
to the United States and the pervasive challenges of patientcentered research in emergencies complicated considerations (Figure 1).

The University of Nebraska Medical Center and its clinical
partner Nebraska Medicine (UNMC/NM) were confronted with
a unique set of circumstances at the start of the U.S. experience with novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) that highlighted core lessons regarding research in emergencies that
might be applied in any location, and to any disease. Ultimately, UNMC/NM conducted a prospective, observational
cohort study beginning with COVID-19–infected persons in
isolation care. The rapidly traveled road to this study had many
curves.
The University of Nebraska Medical Center and its clinical
partner Nebraska Medicine are accustomed to responding to
public health emergencies. It cared for patients with Ebola
virus disease from West Africa; received persons exposed to
other high consequence pathogens; established and maintained the Nebraska Biocontainment Unit; with partners
Emory University, Bellevue Hospital, and the CDC, led the
National Ebola Training and Education Center (NETEC);
launched the National Quarantine Unit funded by the Health
and Human Services (HHS) Assistant Secretary of Preparedness and Response ofﬁce; and established the Global
Center for Health Security to coordinate its other national and
international health emergency initiatives. The biocontainment unit was established in the aftermath of outbreaks of
severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV)
and avian inﬂuenza A in the early 2000s, getting its ﬁrst use in
the 2014–2016 West African Ebola virus disease epidemic.
The unit has critical care capabilities. The quarantine unit has
airborne precaution capabilities but was designed to accommodate groups of individuals who are not ill, a need suggested
by returned healthcare workers following occupational exposures in the West African epidemic. Even for an institution
with experience in both timely research and management of
patients with highly communicable diseases, the conditions

QUARANTINE IS A VERY DIFFERENT RESEARCH SETTING
THAN ISOLATION CARE
Nebraska’s ﬁrst guests related to COVID-19 were 57 men,
women, and children evacuated from Wuhan, China, and in
quarantine. They arrived on federally chartered aircraft and
passed through carefully arranged screening checks manned
by CDC ofﬁcials. Then, uniformed public health service personnel from other agencies within HHS and managed by the
Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response ofﬁce
provided support. Security was present, including U.S. marshals. Everyone—including those who had placed a large
Nebraska welcome banner at the airport, deposited gift baskets in dormitory rooms, or wielded thermometers—wanted
these persons to arrive well, stay well, and feel welcome.
These individuals were glad to be back in the United States.
They did not want others to become infected with COVID-19 if,
in fact, they proved to be ill. Nonetheless, they were constrained by schedule, location, and physical and human barriers until their departure from quarantine. On the verge of the
departure of the evacuees from China, UNMC/NM received a
mix of 11 isolated (infected) and two quarantined (not known to
be infected) individuals evacuated by federal authorities from
a cruise ship in Japan.
The evacuees from Wuhan were among the ﬁrst in the
United States to be placed under quarantine by the federal
government under new authorities established in the 2017
revision of the Code of Federal Regulations1,2 (Box 1). Federal
quarantine orders—the ﬁrst such use in over 50 years—
presented contextual challenges. In general, U.S. quarantine
stations exist at major points of entry, such as at large international airports, where small numbers of sentinel cases of
an emerging disease are thought to be most likely to be ﬁrst
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FIGURE 1. Time line of the path to coronavirus disease research at the University of Nebraska Medical Center and its clinical partner Nebraska
Medicine.

encountered in the United States.3 In late 2019, UNMC/NM
opened the ﬁrst national quarantine unit. This twenty-bed unit
is designed to host larger numbers of quarantined persons
than existing, smaller quarantine stations. It is colocated with a
national training resource for public health emergency personnel, in close proximity to the Nebraska Biocontainment
Unit, to enable more advanced care if needed.4 This large
group of 57 persons, however, were managed by federal
authorities at Camp Ashland—a Nebraska Army National
Guard base outside of Omaha—with some logistics support
from UNMC/NM.
By the time that the quarantined persons from Wuhan arrived, experts had already considered the possibility that
SARS-CoV-2 might shed before symptoms, facilitating its
ability to achieve sustained human-to-human transmission.5
For this reason, UNMC/NM initially sought to test asymptomatic individuals to inform their case management and how
they were housed. However, a consensus regarding the advisability of testing could not be reached with authorities
because of concerns regarding their personal autonomy
(whether the quarantined persons understood the implications of testing and could make a choice freely) and uncertainty about what to do about isolated negative test results.
Testing was not pursued. In the end, none of the quarantined
evacuees from Wuhan demonstrated clinical evidence of
COVID-19.6 The question of scope of presymptomatic shedding remained unanswered.
Toward the end of that quarantine, on 17 February, UNMC/
NM received a group from a cruise ship in Japan comprised
mostly of COVID-19–infected persons.7 The infected individuals were under federal isolation orders as opposed to quarantine; they were known to be infected. Whether simply being
observed in the setting of few or no symptoms, or more ill and
in need of hospital level care, they were housed at UNMC/NM.
By that time, Asia had accumulated many cases, and a literature base was developing.8,9 Nonetheless, cases in the

United States remained few, and availability of information
and specimens from affected areas in Asia that were relevant
to medical countermeasure development was limited. This
prompted UNMC/NM to launch its own research initiative for
the prospective assessment of patients. It did so against a
backdrop of initial hesitancy because of complex issues of
patient autonomy under federal orders, interagency jurisdiction challenges as different governmental actors exercised
their perceived obligations for oversight, and known larger
patient populations in other countries that might make local
research less important.
GOOD SCIENCE IN EMERGENCIES HELPS RISK
MANAGEMENT DECISION-MAKING
Once the decision to initiate research was made, one of
the immediate questions was on what? UNMC/NM participated in the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious
Diseases (NIAID) studies of drug therapy against Ebola
virus disease, and this collaboration continued in support
of an adaptive randomized controlled trial with the antiviral
drug remdesivir. 10,11 As the ﬁrst institution to initiate this
trial for COVID-19 patients in the United States, UNMC/
NM assisted expansion of the trial to additional sites via its
rapid response central Institutional Review Board (IRB)
mechanism for the NETEC Special Pathogens Research
Network.
Finding an effective drug, however, is not the only purpose
of doing research in emergencies. Early in response efforts, a
critical questions and ethics committee was formed. Pulling
from a multidisciplinary base, its purpose was providing a
space for leadership and others to air questions, concerns,
and challenges that might represent an obstruction to effective risk management—a space to reﬂect amidst an otherwise
operationally fast-paced environment. Fielded questions were
sometimes narrow and sometimes broad. They often
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BOX 1
A revised quarantine law’s ﬁrst use
On January 31, 2020, the CDC issued a federal mandatory quarantine order for 195 Americans evacuated out of Wuhan, China, on January
29.18 Effective February 2, Health and Human Services declared a mandatory quarantine for any U.S. citizens or permanent residents returning
to the United States who had returned from the Hubei Province of China in the previous 14 days. In addition, all U.S. citizens and permanent
residents returning from mainland China were required to undergo two weeks of self-monitoring.
This marked the ﬁrst time in over 50 years that mandatory federal quarantine had been invoked under the CDC’s jurisdiction. By contrast,
federal isolation orders have been comparatively common. Isolation differs from quarantine in that isolation requires infection with a
quarantinable, communicable disease, not just exposure. Between 2005 and 2016, the CDC issued 12 federal isolation orders,19 relying
mainly on port-of-entry screening.
Historically, state and local health departments have executed most quarantine orders. In 2019, to decrease the spread of measles in
California, Los Angeles County did so for more than 200 individuals at two college campuses.20 The quarantine measure met little resistance.
Other state orders have not been so well received. In 2014, New Jersey issued a quarantine order for a nurse returning to the United States after
caring for Ebola patients in Sierra Leone. Afterward, the nurse ﬁled suit in federal court, stating that New Jersey had violated her constitutional
rights to liberty and due process. She later dropped her suit, settling in favor of changes to the state’s quarantine regulations, including
provisions for the right to counsel, notice of hearings, visitor rights, and the right to privacy.21 The case suggests where some points of friction
may arise as the CDC continues its COVID-19 orders.
Coronavirus Disease-19 quarantines also were the ﬁrst to test recently updated regulations. In 1967, quarantine authority shifted to the CDC
for cases involving ports of entry, with interstate quarantine added to the CDC’s jurisdiction in 2000. Related regulations have had several
updates, most recently in 2017, with a stated focus on individuals’ due process rights.
Some anticipated issues include mandatory reassessment of quarantine cases, social distancing practices, compensation for lost wages, and
payment for the care and treatment of quarantined individuals. Under the current regulations, any federal isolation or quarantine order must be
reassessed within 72 hours of issuance of the order, seemingly impractical in light of large numbers of related cases, if conducted individually.
It may be impossible to house each person alone, despite the consequences for housemates if the person is infected. In addition, regulations
do not expressly direct payment for the care and treatment of individuals subject to a federal quarantine. These costs may include diagnostic
testing. The regulations allow that the director of the CDC may authorize payment for such care and treatment, but that payment is in the CDC’s
sole discretion. This language leaves matters of payment open to interpretation and negotiation, which may be a hindrance to real-time
decision-making.
Many of these issues relate to differences between small-scale quarantines and the additional challenge of larger scale events, as relevant for
COVID-19. As this health emergency evolves, ambiguous guidelines, combined with the unprecedented nature and scale of this quarantine,
could impact the operational response. The CDC is in a unique situation to take precedent-setting action, establishing new standards for how
federal quarantine should occur in the United States for many years to come.

highlighted uncertainty about the disease itself, which limited
the ability to make evidence-based decisions. This process
facilitated stakeholders coming together to start pursuing
answers (Box 2). The committee also undertook a survey of
research associated with the response and started to link risk
management challenges with sources of information that
might assist decision-making. Several needs were evident as
research planning discussions ensued (Box 3). Importantly,
these discussions led to a broad picture of how a platform for
research might be applied, and a prospective, observational
cohort study design was selected.
HAVING PREEXISTING PROTOCOLS IS VERY HELPFUL
Fortunately, the International Severe Acute Respiratory and
Emerging Infection Consortium (ISARIC) and the World Health
Organization (WHO) had been working on a protocol for just
such a prospective, observational cohort study for several
years.12 Known as the Clinical Characterization Protocol for
Severe Emerging Infections, it represents a longitudinal effort
to generate and keep updated an internationally harmonized
protocol for the evaluation of emerging infections.13
The existence of a well-developed protocol with case
report form, informed consent documents, and other supporting materiel had immediate advantages. From a science management perspective, the most striking aspect
was that the well-documented evolution of the protocol
simpliﬁed local scientiﬁc review requirements. Moreover, it
was easier to edit than to initiate writing. UNMC/NM
changes to documents reﬂected technical preferences,
differences in local law or institutional requirements, or
using the documents in a referral academic center rather

than a resource-limited setting. Overall, the ISARIC materials saved at least several days in the process and provided
important guideposts.
STRONG STRUCTURES MUST ALSO BE FACILE
UNMC/NM have several unique features in its IRB. The IRB
has technical breadth, a dedicated pool of community representatives, and a process for rapid review. In addition, the
university has invested in this ofﬁce so that when called upon
for rapid reviews, there are sufﬁcient highly committed staff to
participate in management and oversight of the process, as
well as consultation with petitioning investigators. Just as
importantly, the IRB has experience with reviews in emergencies and related exercises. It also has worked through how
to facilitate cooperative research through its central IRB
mechanism for the Special Pathogens Research Network,
comprising 10 academic centers that serve as regional referral
isolation care hospitals.14 The regulatory process reﬂects a
general posture toward discovery in parallel with clinical care
shared across its network partners.15 Operational efﬁciency
such as that provided by the central IRB was impactful in
ensuring the window of opportunity was not lost.
A curious, structural aspect of research preparedness that
became clear while assisting other sites considering adoption
of the UNMC/NM prospective, observational cohort study
was the importance of routine access. UNMC/NM and other
referral location personnel regularly access isolation care
spaces in training and response activities, as well as participate in community coordination in the management of patients who may have an infection with a high consequence
pathogen. Consequently, the primary pool of investigators
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BOX 2
Critical Questions and Ethics Vignette
The University of Nebraska Medical Center and its clinical partner Nebraska Medicine established a Critical Questions and Ethics committee
immediately before experiencing its ﬁrst COVID-19 patients. This allowed decision-makers and implementers alike a space in which to air
concerns based on unanswered questions or perceived operational or organizational risks. The committee was advisory in nature. One such
question asked how best to prioritize N95 respirators that were anticipated to be in short supply. The conversation revolved around ﬁt-testing
requirements. At a center like UNMC/NM, several hundred respirators are consumed each year in quantitative ﬁt testing for staff who have
newly arrived, or for required periodic testing. Logistical, ethical, legal, and operational considerations included ﬁnding the right balance
between the need for appropriate ﬁt—especially if at high risk of SARS-CoV-2 exposure, differences in regulatory intent for ﬁt testing and a
more rigorous standard applied by the university, and preconceived notions of need, practice, and requirements. Several small program
adjustments were thought to have promise. These were reevaluating nondestructive or qualitative ﬁt testing, using a survey to enable a longer
interval before retesting, and prioritizing new employees and areas with higher risk for encounters with ill patients. Important research avenues
emerged, and this process highlighted the need for interdisciplinary approaches. Environmental hygiene, logistics, and implementation
science aims all arose from the conversation in ways that might not otherwise have emerged. Decision-related knowledge needs relevant to
the prospective, observational cohort study described in this article have included viral shedding dynamics, clinical course relevant to
resource demand, and the horizon of available medical countermeasures and their development.

needed at the bedside and in the laboratory are readily able to
undertake practices and follow procedures within containment areas, including Institutional Biosafety Committee–
appropriate laboratory spaces. Consequently, when an
emergency such as the COVID-19 pandemic occurs, the work
is feasible.
In each emergency, some structures preexist, some must
be applied anew, and priorities must be set.16 For COVID-19
with a remdesivir drug trial from NIAID on site and its potential
to impact care generally, UNMC/NM tiered offers of enrollment to its patients, ﬁrst screening for the drug trial before
considering other research on a given patient.

EVERYONE HAS REQUESTS THAT MUST BE MANAGED
In just over a week from conception, in the beginnings of
delivering isolation care, seven participants with COVID-19
infections were enrolled in a prospective, observational cohort
study for severe emerging infections. The study rapidly accumulated both prospectively collected and residual clinical
specimens. In contrast to accumulated experiences in Asia
and some other affected areas, the cohort was small. Nonetheless, it captured high-quality specimens coupled with data
of value to researchers and product developers in the midst of
a new emerging infectious disease.
The UNMC/NM prospective observational cohort study
incorporated a tissue bank, allowing the later use of study
specimens. In accordance with regulatory requirements, it has

a governance structure. A Priorities Steering Committee was
established immediately, including some members of the investigator group and other stakeholders. A formal request
process for use of data and specimens was instituted, and a
request tracker quickly ﬁlled with governmental, academic,
and industry requests that were as varied as they were rapid.
The committee adopted a long view for use of the tissue
bank, recognizing the need to balance exigent with future
possibilities for use. It recognized the importance of transparency, cooperative work meeting aims not achievable by
smaller groups or individuals, and the need to facilitate
meaningful innovation that might not be served by other
initiatives.
In emergencies, however, long views may not be popular,
requests are not always rational, disclosures and realistic
assessments are not often available on the actual utility of an
experiment in the context of the emergency at hand, and respect for autonomy and appreciation of the intent of a gift of
data and sample by a patient are not always appreciated.
However, that investigators believe in their work and seek to
advance discovery is important for both patients and science.
Being arbiters of limited resources in this context means that
everyone must make compromises.

FUNDING IS COMPLICATED
UNMC/NM launched the prospective, observational cohort
study without external funding. Cohort studies often are

BOX 3
Important features of a research cohort study during any health emergency
• Risk identiﬁcation and characterization of the disease in patients
• Hypotheses generation with a potential to impact patient- and community-centered outcomes
• Continual patient population assessment so that work to test hypotheses is best designed and fundamental processes are well framed and
practiced
• Flexibility to interact with clinical care and public health teams when the study could provide meaningful information, particularly in real time
or near real time, including coordination with environmental sampling and testing
• Potential to explore data, specimens, and the results of analysis over time, to include the potential for cooperative work with partners across
stakeholder groups
• Flexibility to adjust the schedule of events when exigencies such as when infection prevention and control posture or immediate patient
interests require changes
• Durable rather than ﬂeeting investment of time and other resources, so that all are ready when new health emergencies present
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challenging to fund. Research dollars tend not to align with
durable, multi-threat capabilities.17 Such studies may be
supported in part through sub-study funding, for instance, to
test a particular device and assay in the laboratory on samples
from cohort members. Without new funding solutions, the
development of valuable cohorts may not be possible.
SUMMARY
The University of Nebraska Medical Center and its clinical
partner Nebraska Medicine quickly established a prospective,
observational cohort study for severe emerging infections
during the 2020 COVID-19 emergency, while supporting national quarantine and isolation care activities and launching an
NIAID randomized, controlled drug trial. This was possible
thanks to preexisting resources from the international community and durable partners, as well as structures that support
research review and execution with intrinsic aspects that allow
ﬂexibility. Studies in emergencies must be designed in ways
mindful of the context in which they start, and yet have a long
view. As in all science, aims must be clear, mechanisms for
governance present, and opportunities for reﬂection and input
encouraged. Despite challenges and sometimes a lack of
external funding support, research is a worthwhile undertaking to advance understanding and seek risk management solutions.
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